Haryana Kabaddi League Expansion: How Sustainable Is the Second Tier in PKL's Broadcast Vacuum?

Nobody was waiting for the referee's whistle. At the central trials ground in Sonipat, more than 6,400 young kabaddi players registered their names—I first saw this number last month, when the Haryana-based Kabaddi Champions League (CKL) announced expansion to 10 franchises. What does 6,400 registrations mean? It is not a final selection list but a signal of cultural demand. And that signal is currently the most credible data point in Indian kabaddi—not from a media release, but rising from the soil.

I have been covering kabaddi since 2026, starting as a kabaddi reporter at a national daily in Dhaka, later moving to the youth beat. In 2026, after watching all 64 matches of the Russia World Cup, I built a "Youth Pipeline Index" tracking 48 under-23 players—their club academy pathways, minutes, youth national team caps, first-team debut ages, and loan histories. In 2026, when the pandemic cancelled the Rangpur U-18 league, I wrote a six-part series on 22 youth players, including the household income calculation of a striker whose academy stipend was cut by 60 percent. That experience taught me: in any league expansion announcement, the first questions must be—where is the money coming from, and what are the players getting?

The CKL announcement has no answer to the second question. The first question's answer is also vague.

The competition structure we can see

The Pro Kabaddi League (PKL), launched in India in 2026, turned kabaddi into a prime-time television product. The PKL's success rests on three pillars: the 30-second raid and Do-or-Die raid rules that hook viewers, and the auction-based franchise model. The CKL is copying all three—but at roughly one-thirtieth of the PKL's scale.

Let us look at the numbers. Each CKL franchise has an auction purse of Rs 5 crore (about USD 600,000). The total salary budget across 10 teams is Rs 50 crore. Yet the auction pool has more than 300 players. On average, each player earns less than Rs 16 lakh—roughly BDT 2 lakh. That is extremely low for any professional league. The top auction price was Ayan Lochab at Rs 17.4 lakh (Jhajjar Jaguars), second Bharat Hooda at Rs 16.6 lakh (Karnal Kings), third Naveen Goyat at Rs 15.2 lakh (Kurukshetra Knights).

Here lies the first anomaly that the original report missed. Sunil Malik is described as "India's Asian Games captain." He was bought by Faridabad Fighters for just Rs 10 lakh—Rs 7.4 lakh less than the top price, and less than three other players. If he truly is a national team captain, why the low price? Three possibilities exist: he is a defensive or utility player whom PKL market logic undervalues; or age or form has declined; or the "Asian Games captain" title refers to an older era, not the current squad. The report moved on without flagging this anomaly.

Auction prices are never a performance metric. I saw this repeatedly in my 2026 pipeline index—a top price of Rs 17.4 lakh in a second-tier league means a shortage of star players in the market, not an abundance of talent. In the PKL, top stars command crores; here it stops at about USD 20,000. So the "highest-priced player" label is a marketing device, not a quality ranking.

Geographic concentration: Champions League name, Haryana reality

All 10 CKL teams are named after Haryana cities—Jhajjar, Kurukshetra, Bhiwani, Rohtak, Karnal, Gurugram, Sonipat, Panipat, Faridabad, Hisar. That is, it is a state-level league with "Champions League" in its name. Haryana is India's kabaddi heartland—its rural akhadas (mud training grounds) produce wrestlers and kabaddi players, and the sport is a pathway to railway, police, and army jobs for poor farming families. So 6,400 trial registrations are not surprising.

But this concentration is also the league's limitation. Without a national broadcast deal, 10 Haryana teams cannot become a national sports product. When I read the CKL expansion announcement, I noticed something: nowhere is there any mention of a broadcast partner, sponsorship deal, or media rights. The absence of a broadcast deal in a league expansion announcement is itself information.

And here lies the real story.

The CKL is expanding precisely when the PKL's 13th season is in uncertainty. According to reports, the PKL's broadcast rights agreement has ended, no new media partner has been secured, and the 13th season has been pushed to June-July 2027. The CKL is stepping into this vacuum.

I call this timing "broadcast-vacuum arbitrage." If the PKL secures a new broadcaster by mid-2027, the CKL's strategic rationale weakens significantly. Because then players will return to the PKL, and viewers will follow.

What nobody is saying: player welfare

More than 300 players, a Rs 5 crore purse—in this equation, a player's income is so low that he cannot be called professional. They are semi-professional at best. For those who missed out on the PKL or aged out, the CKL is a shelter. But what are the shelter's terms? Contract duration, injury insurance, wage guarantees—none of this appears in the report. My experience from the 2026 Rangpur U-18 crisis tells me that when stipends are cut by 60 percent, players' mental health and family pressure break first. Is the same fate waiting here?

Another issue: the league's organizational identity is nowhere. Is there approval from the Amateur Kabaddi Federation of India (AKFI) or the International Kabaddi Federation (IKF)? The report does not answer. If there is no sanction, playing in this league could obstruct players' path to the national team. That is a serious governance gap.

My warning: the "Champions League" name is misleading

Outside India, especially in Bangladesh, someone reading this news might think it is a major international or national-level league. In reality, it is a second-tier domestic competition among 10 Haryana cities. Its relationship with the PKL is not rivalry but dependence—the CKL gets the field only because the PKL is delayed.

The biggest positive signal for me is just one: 6,400 trial registrations. It proves that kabaddi demand is alive in Haryana's soil. But to sustain that demand, transparent wage structures, broadcast deals, and federation recognition are needed.

Three signals I will watch over the next 12 months: First, who secures the PKL's broadcast rights—a major Indian media house or a digital platform? Second, can the CKL itself secure any broadcast or sponsorship deal? Third, in the second season, what are spectator attendance and match quality like?

The answers to these three will determine whether the CKL is a genuine investment in kabaddi's future, or a temporary shelter in the PKL's broadcast vacuum.

My final question is this: If the PKL returns to broadcast in 2027, how many of those 6,400 young Haryana players will still be on CKL courts—and how many will return to their village akhadas, where there is no auction, no purse, only the hope of playing?